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Abstract: 
The inspection process is a core component of the Antarctic Treaty 1959 and the Environmental 
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty 1991. In the early days of the Antarctic Treaty, inspections 
conducted focussed on ensuring the demilitarisation of Antarctica and promotion and observance of 
the Treaty provisions. After adoption of the Environmental Protocol, inspections were then viewed 
as a systematic means of verifying that activities were conducted to minimise potential 
environmental impacts. Among the rights given to Treaty members is that of mutual inspection, 
whereby all sites and facilities including stations, vessels, protected areas and refuges are subject to 
inspection. Even with the challenges of operating in a highly political and complex jurisdictional 
environment 386 inspections have been conducted since 1962 involving 23 of the current 29 Treaty 
Parties. Significant practical and political achievements of the inspections include international 
collaboration to conduct joint inspections, an increased focus on environmental issues and improved 
information exchange between Treaty Parties, non-governmental operators and the international 
community.  Recommendations for improving the inspection process are presented including 
adoption of an independent inspectorate, a formal schedule of inspections and mandatory reporting 
and follow-up through the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. The paper concludes that, despite 
significant challenges to the inspection regime, the process is a basic pillar of the Treaty system and 
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  Under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), member States are empowered to make 
inspections of the bases, ships and facilities of other member States within the Antarctic Treaty 
Area. The powers afforded under the Antarctic Treaty 1959 (the Treaty) are reaffirmed in the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (the Madrid Protocol). The right 
to inspect is intended to act as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with the provisions of each of 
these instruments. It is a right which has long been exercised by the Treaty parties and is one of the 
only avenues through which States can monitor the activities of their fellow member States. 
However, within the highly political context of the ATS and the complex jurisdictional issues 
surrounding activities on the continent there are some significant challenges to this inspection 
regime’s effectiveness. In order to address these challenges, this paper will examine the intentions 
of parties in incorporating an inspection regime into the Treaty instruments and how the role of 
inspections has changed over time. It will then look at what has been achieved through the exercise 
of the right to inspect, both practically and politically. Finally, it will look at the character of 
inspection recommendations and offer some suggestions for how the regime might be improved to 
give more weight to these recommendations.  
The Role of Inspections  
  The right to inspect forms part of the members of the Treaty system’s powers through both 
the Treaty itself and the Madrid Protocol. Both instruments include provisions which empower 
parties to inspect the bases of their cohort to ensure compliance with each document’s respective 
provisions. However, during the life of the Treaty system the role played by the exercise of these 
inspections has changed and the focus of inspection parties has shifted.  
Inspections under the Antarctic Treaty 1959 
  The Antarctic Treaty 1959 dedicates Antarctica to the pursuit of peace and science. Despite 
this seemingly esoteric and rhetorical aim, in reality it is an international agreement intended to 
diffuse mounting international tension in respect of sovereignty within the continent and growing 
concerns about its use as a military staging point (Hanevold, 1971). Firmly grounded in its Cold War 
context, the Treaty’s opening article, perhaps unsurprisingly, deals not with the fostering of scientific 
cooperation but with a prohibition on the establishment of military bases and the use of the 
continent for military manoeuvres, though military support of scientific activities is still permitted 
(Antarctic Treaty 1959, Article I).   
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  Within the context of the Cold War, it is perhaps unsurprising that there may have been 
misgivings amongst the parties, and to some extent a level of mistrust, where compliance with the 
Treaty’s provisions is concerned. This concern seems to have been most centred on compliance with 
Article I’s prohibitions (Hanevold, 1971). The inspection regime was proposed as a means to allow 
each of the Treaty parties the power to check up on their Antarctic neighbours and to encourage 
them to live up to their obligations. It was the United States of America which was the most vocal in 
their support of the inclusion of an inspection regime, to the extent that they would not accede to a 
Treaty which did not include this power (Hanevold, 1971).  
After some negotiation in respect of the form these inspections would take, the Treaty parties 








Figure 1: Article VII of the Treaty 
  The role of inspections under this provision was intended to be twofold – firstly to ensure 
that none of the parties were breaching the Article I prohibitions and, secondly, to encourage parties 
to live up to their obligations in terms of information sharing (Jabour, 2013). It is also worth noting 
that this provision was seen by the government of the USA as a potential pilot scheme for a similar 
inspection programme between itself and the USSR outside of the Antarctic context, in order to 
relieve Cold War tensions (Hanevold, 1971). This is suggestive of the fact that the USA were less 
concerned, at least at the outset, with using inspections to foster scientific cooperation than they 
were with the preservation of Antarctica as a demilitarised zone.  
  Inspections carried out under Article VII of the Treaty have largely been focussed on 
ensuring that bases, stations and other facilities, even where they are supported by military 
personnel or equipment, have in fact been used for science rather than some ulterior purpose. For 
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instance, the USA conducted an inspection of a number of bases between 1966 and 1967 and 
concluded that:  
 
“there was no evidence to indicate any violence of either the provisions or the spirit of 
the treaty. All the information obtained at the stations indicates that Antarctica is 
being used solely for peaceful purposes. Weapons found at some stations were used for 
scientific purposes only, for example for the purpose of killing animal specimens for 
biological studies” (United States of America, 1967, p.2). 
  There is a clear indication in this passage that whether or not a base or facility is being used 
for military purposes was the focus of the inspection. The reports on the individual stations are brief 
and consist of only a short summary of the nature of scientific research taking place before stating 
whether or not weaponry or nuclear materials were found on site. While this report was convened 
by the Department of State, it is interesting to note that subsequent USA inspections, such as the 
1975 multi-base inspection, were published on behalf of the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Committee (United States of America, 1975). This indicates again the strong emphasis being placed 
on preserving the demilitarisation of the continent through the inspection regime under Article VII of 
the Treaty. 
Inspections under the Madrid Protocol 1991 
  The power of states to inspect has been incorporated into the provisions of the Madrid 
Protocol in Article XIV, which states: 
In order to promote the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems, and to ensure compliance with this Protocol, the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties shall arrange, individually or collectively, for inspections by 
observers to be made in accordance with Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty.  
  The parties now have the right to inspect to ensure they are not only cooperating and 
operating in a peaceful manner, but to ensure they are living up to their environmental protection 
obligations under the Protocol. It is here that we see the biggest shift in the role played by 
inspections. Article XIV reinvigorates the inspection regime of the Treaty proper but with a more 
specific focus. It signifies that the parties are moving away from an era where concerns about 
militarisation of Antarctica took precedence and towards a period in history where environmental 
concerns are predominant. This Article is more prescriptive than its parent Article in that it requires 
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positive action by all treaty states in both arranging and facilitating inspections (Jabour, 2013). 
Rather than simply being a provision to ensure the Madrid Protocol’s provisions are not being 
breached, this Article goes further in that it empowers inspectors to look at the impact of a state’s 
activities on the environment more generally.   
  In exercising their right of inspection since the passing of the Madrid Protocol, States are 
empowered to investigate for breaches of either instrument. However, the focus of States has 
shifted away from concerns about the military use of bases and towards the more environmental 
focus encompassed in the Protocol (Walton, 2015). Where an inspection report does address 
matters of military presence on base, it is included as something of a matter of course rather than as 
the primary focus of the investigation.  
  An example of this is in the report of the recent joint inspection by British and Czech national 
programmes carried over the 2014/15 season. Several bases and facilities on the Antarctic Peninsula 
were visited and a detailed inspection report published. The report notes very briefly under each of 
the stations that no ammunition or weaponry et cetera was found on base, but does not go so far as 
to include in the report’s overall conclusions a statement that the bases are being used for peaceful 
purposes only (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015). This is in stark contrast to the 1967 USA 
report discussed above, where the only overall conclusion was heavily focussed on this finding. The 
conclusions are divided into the subcategories: 
- Personnel and Training 
- Quality and Quantity of Scientific research 
- Logistics and Infrastructure 
- Transport and Communications 
- Safety, Training and Emergency Procedures 
- Environmental Management 
- Medical Facilities 
- Tourism 
  Notably absent from this list is a specific subcategory concluding the absence of military 
activities and/or the use of bases for peaceful purposes. This suggests that the fact that bases are 
used for peaceful purposes is taken as somewhat of a given, not worthy of raising where there is no 
specific cause for concern. It may be that this shows a growing level of trust amongst the Antarctic 
nations but is more likely simply a matter of political politeness with States being reluctant to openly 
suggest that militarisation of Antarctica is still an active concern in need of monitoring. Despite this, 
it is worth noting that this report does still include some queries as regards the use of military 
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personnel rather than civilian staff or scientists (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015, p.58). 
The primary concern of this observation was that there was no clear science direction justifying the 
existence, and to some extent the associated environmental impact of the station, rather than 
suggesting it had an ulterior purpose. There is one sole recommendation suggesting that the data 
collected by German O’Higgins Receiving Station may be for military purposes (United Kingdom and 
Czech Republic, 2015, p.56). In its feedback to the inspection team (annexed to the report) the 
German government refuted this suggestion, asserting that their operations were civilian and 
scientific in nature.  
Summary 
  The role of inspections has shifted since the early days of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Where once concerns about the military use of bases, facilities and vessels were at the forefront of 
the minds of inspectors and formed the primary focus of inspection reports, since the coming into 
force of the Madrid Protocol this focus has changed. Now inspectors are more concerned with 
ensuring that environmental standards are being maintained, that bases are properly staffed and are 
being run safely and sustainably, and that their continued presence is justified by high quantity and 
quality science outputs. While breaches of the Treaty itself are still investigated by inspectors, at 
least outwardly the role of inspections has become about trying to encourage best environmental 
practice by States operating in the Antarctic where once that role was discouraging States from 
attempting to use Antarctica as a military outpost. 
Practical and Political Achievements of the Inspection Regime 
Introduction 
“Inspections should be undertaken in the spirit of mutual cooperation and ... work like 
an audit, looking for 'opportunities for change', rather than 'errors…'” (Tin et al 2013, 
p.303). 
  An integrated approach to the conservation of the Antarctic environment and management 
of human activities requires anticipation of upcoming risks and challenges and adoption of proactive 
management strategies (Convey et al., 2012). The inspection process is such a strategy and is a core 
component of the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol, providing a systematic means of 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the Antarctic management system (Hushen, 1985). The right to 
inspect is also important in maintaining the confidence of parties to the Antarctic Treaty and the 
international community, ensuring the principles and purposes of the Treaty and its provisions and 
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recommendations are being fully realised. By the very nature of international Antarctic operations, 
differences in administration and application of the regulatory framework exist. Despite these 
differences, the inspection process has facilitated a number of key practical and political 
achievements. These include the frequency of inspections, international collaboration, an increased 
focus on environmental issues, compliance with the Madrid Protocol and improved exchange of 
information. 
 
Frequency of Inspections  
  Under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol all sites and facilities 
are subject to inspection. The inspection process is complicated in the first instance by the lack of an 
official list of all sites and facilities and, although main stations are listed, additional facilities such as 
substantial field camps are not (ASOC & UNEP, 2003). The Council of  Managers of National Antarctic 
Programs (COMNAP) provide the most comprehensive collation of facility data and note that as at 
February 2012 there were 82 stations (73 of which are in the Antarctic Treaty area), 19 camps and 2 
refuges (COMNAP, 2016). Given the remoteness of the Antarctic, difficulties with site accessibility, 
logistical costs, governance issues and the political motivations of 29 Consultative Parties, 24 non-
Consultative Parties and non-governmental operators, the operational requirements involved in 
planning and then mobilising an observation team is a significant achievement in itself.  
 
  The first inspection of three stations of the United States was undertaken by New Zealand in 
1962. Since this time 386 inspections of stations (314), vessels (32), historic sites and monuments 
(HSM) /protected areas (27) and refuges (13) have been conducted noting some are repeated sites 
(Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2016). These inspections have involved 23 of the current 29 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) in 52 inspection programs. Figure 2 details the number 
of inspections conducted since the Madrid Protocol came into effect in 1998 (Secretariat of the 
Antarctic Treaty, 2016). During the last 18 years 187 formal inspections have been completed 
including 130 stations, 25 vessels, 26 HSM/protected areas and 6 refuges. It is evident that there are 
significant fluctuations in the number of inspections conducted each season. This can partly be 
attributed to the lack of an inspection schedule and priority list (ASOC, 2004), high costs and 
logistical constraints (Giuliani, 1996; United Kingdom, 1994) and some governments attaching a low 
priority to inspections (Beck, 2014). Global issues such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 9/11 
terrorist bombings also impact on the conduct of inspections in Antarctica when resources are 
diverted away from Antarctic science programs (Jabour, 2013). However, inspection provisions will 
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Year of Inspection 
Inspections 1998/99 - 2014/15 
Bases & Stations Vessels Historic Sites & Monuments, Protected Areas Other - Refuge
continue to increase in significance as there is growth in the level and types of activity in Antarctica 
(United Kingdom 1994) and this is reflected in figure 2. It is also widely recognised that Parties 
conduct informal inspections that are not reported through the formal Antarctic Treaty System (Rory 





















Figure 2. Inspections conducted 1998/99 -2014/15 (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2016) 
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Year of Inspection 
Joint Inspections 1988/89 - 2014/15 
Station Vessel Historic Site Monument / Protected Areas Other
In 2003 the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) recommended that, to further improve the program, inspections could focus on 
stations that have never or seldom been inspected, inland stations, decommissioned and abandoned 
sites, stations that have not addressed recommendations made during previous inspections and 
sites where tourism operators frequent.  
 
 
International Collaboration and Joint Inspections 
Article XIV of the Madrid Protocol suggests the possibility of collective inspections to promote 
protection of the Antarctic environment. The first joint inspection of 11 stations was undertaken by 
New Zealand and the United States during the 1988/89 season. During the 1991 Treaty meeting the 
ATCPs agreed that joint inspections between two or more Contracting Parties should be encouraged 
(ATCM 1991). Since 1962, 13 joint inspection programs have been undertaken with 121 stations, 24 
vessels, 19 Historic Sites and Monuments/Protected Areas and two refuges having been inspected, 
involving 17 of the current ATCPs (figure 3). Of the 166 inspections in total, 128 have been 
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Figure 3. Joint inspections conducted by Antarctic Treaty Parties (Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 2015) 
  There are notable benefits when Parties work in unison when planning and undertaking 
inspection programs. The management and coordination of a joint inspection is both a practical and 
political achievement in the effort to improve the efficiency of operations and the value of 
cooperative efforts in Antarctica. Joint inspections are also likely to increase their frequency. Also, 
joint inspections allow more countries to be involved in the process by reducing individual 
expenditure on logistics (United Kingdom, 1994; Sweden 1991). During the 2014/15 season, the 
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic undertook a joint inspection program of 13 stations, 11 
vessels and one refuge (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015). Such a comprehensive 
inspection program would be difficult to achieve in one season by a single State party. Another 
notable benefit of this joint inspection process was the ability of the ten member observation team 
to fluently communicate in seven languages, thereby maximising potential opportunities to openly 
communicate and address issues during the inspection program.  
  Inspections also promote openness, facilitate cooperation (Norway, 2001) and collaboration 
on scientific research and ideas on Antarctic operations (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015; 
AOT, 2005). During the 2014 joint inspection of the Chilean and German stations personnel were 
commended for their sharing of logistics to transport German scientists and support staff. Juan 
Carlos, a joint glaciological program between Spain and Japan was also highlighted as a key 
achievement in international collaboration. The sharing of logistics and renewable energy from wind 
turbines by New Zealand and the United States has been recognised in the Scott Base and McMurdo 
station inspections by Australia (AOT, 2005). Furthermore, with the move towards increasing the 
number of joint inspections, those Parties who currently drive Antarctic environmental policy will be 
able to engage and encourage other less active Parties to participate (Convey et al., 2012). 
Focus on Environmental Issues 
  The Antarctic Treaty System perhaps did not recognise the potential of inspections for 
improving environmental protection until the United States used an Environmental Checklist as part 
of a base inspection in the Ross Sea in 1989 (United States, 1989). Since that inspection, and the 
adoption of the Madrid Protocol in 1991, the ATCP deliberations have increasingly focused on the 
protection of the Antarctic environment (UNEP & ASOC, 2012). ASOC, a staunch supporter of the 
inspection process, state that inspections are a fundamental element of the Antarctic Treaty System 
as a means of monitoring human activities in Antarctica (ASOC, 2004). 
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  Prior to the Madrid Protocol entering into force in 1998 inspections of Antarctic stations and 
vessels were undertaken primarily to ensure compliance with Article I of the Antarctic Treaty in 
prohibiting military activities, disposal of radioactive waste and nuclear explosions (Walton, 2015). 
Article XIV of the Madrid Protocol restates the Antarctic Treaty’s right of inspection. Issues of 
environmental compliance became more significant when the Protocol was enforced and became 
legally binding on all governmental and non-governmental operators. Nowadays, in addition to 
verifying adherence to the fundamental principles and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty there is 
more emphasis on environmental matters (Jabour, 2013; United Kingdom and Czech, 2015). 
Environmental practices are now the focus of inspections undertaken as evidenced by the content of 
inspection reports (AOT, 2005; United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015). The practicality of the 
inspection program provides checks to help ensure that protected areas are being managed and 
waste disposal and environmental impact assessment measures are being implemented (Hushen, 
1985). The report of the XIV ATCM notes the potential for inspections to also address cumulative 
effects of human activities (ATCM 1991). 
  Maitri Station in Queen Maud Land, managed by the Indian Antarctic Program, 
demonstrates the improvements in environmental practices achieved due to undertaking an 
inspection program (India, 2015). Maitri was inspected by Japan in 2010, Russia and the United 
States in 2012 and South Africa and Germany in 2013. Environmental conservation measures were 
one of the key inspection criteria. Issues identified included leakage from the wastewater pond into 
a nearby lake, discarded vehicles and metal waste, inadequate fuel spill infrastructure and a general 
lack of awareness among expedition members of environmental protection. In May 2015 India 
presented a Background Paper to the CEP noting significant improvements to environmental 
practices including installation of a new wastewater treatment system, back-loading of 1000 old fuel 
barrels, construction of new fuel tanks and bunded areas and the introduction of mandatory 
environmental briefings for all expeditioners (India, 2015). This provides strong evidence that 
environmental issues were brought to the attention of the ATCPs because of the inspection program 
and issues were addressed due to reporting through the CEP and follow-up inspections.  
Compliance with the Environmental Protocol 1991 
  The inspection regime is essential to the implementation of the Antarctic Treaty and the 
Madrid Protocol (ASOC & UNEP, 2003). As the purpose of inspection is to verify through observation 
(Saul & Stephens, 2015), inspection reports can provide on-ground critical, unbiased and objective 
information on the conduct of environmental practices and the level of compliance. Realistically, the 
conduct of inspections should encourage compliance with the Madrid Protocol as it is not in the best 
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interest of Parties to be identified at the ATCMs as having breached environmental provisions. The 
example of Maitri station, which has been inspected on three occasions, demonstrates the value of 
repeated inspections in encouraging compliance with the Protocol (India, 2015).  
 
  Jabour (2013) reviewed inspection reports over 13 seasons between 1998 and 2011 and 
found no infringements of the Antarctic Treaty and only minor infringements of the Madrid Protocol 
were noted. This outcome could be interpreted as a system working seamlessly, although  it is also 
proposed that the inspection process is somewhat symbolic due to the lack of infringements 
identified (Jabour 2013). However, this also illustrates the complexities around enforcement and 
compliance under the Antarctic Treaty System where sanctions and penalties are not applied to 
Parties breaching the regulatory provisions. There is evidence in the UK and Czech inspection of the 
Bulgarian St Kliment Ohridski Station of compliance being encouraged as a result of the inspection 
program (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015). The joint inspection team noted an 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) had not been completed for construction of a storage 
facility that was due to commence. The recommendation was made that an EIA was required and 
this in turn halted construction and avoided a significant breach of the EIA provisions under the 
Madrid Protocol and a likely improvement in environmental practices. 
 
  The inspection process can be an effective management tool for identifying environmental 
issues and ensuring follow-up recommendations are addressed. The inspection provisions should be 
regarded as an important means of ensuring transparent operations in Antarctica between Parties 
(United Kingdom, 1994). However, it is acknowledged that at times the effectiveness of the 
inspections in encouraging compliance largely depends on the will of the Parties (Pineschi, 1996). 
ASOC (1992) note that verifying compliance with the provisions of the Madrid Protocol, is 
compounded by the fact that criticising another Party requires that ‘one’s own house is in order’ 
(ASOC, 1992). If breaches or potential breaches are treated with indifference by perpetrators 
(Auburn, 1982) or hidden within station walls (Jabour, 2013) then perhaps this is a failing by the 
ATCPs in ensuring recommendations are followed-up, not with the onsite inspection process itself.   
 
Exchange of Information 
  A further achievement of the inspection process is the facilitation of information exchange 
between Treaty Parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (ASOC, 2004). At ATCM XVI the 
ATCPs agreed that inspections could play a useful role, not only as an instrument of compliance, but 
also as a means of exchange of experience and knowledge between Contracting Parties (Sweden, 
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1991). In order for this to occur, annual inspection reports are circulated to the CEP and ATCM, 
which facilitates the sharing of knowledge and experience amongst the ATCPs.  Inspectors are 
required to review all documents prior to conducting an inspection, including the Antarctic Treaty 
Exchange of Information, annual reports to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), 
COMNAP and the Standing Committee on Antarctic Logistics and Operations (SCALOP). The joint UK 
and Czech inspection team noted the benefit of reviewing past inspection checklists in determining if 
progress had been made addressing issues noted in previous inspections (United Kingdom and Czech 
Republic, 2015).  
  Inspection reports are also data-gathering tools for Parties (Jabour, 2013) in the context of 
compliance with military prohibitions and the requirement for Parties to provide information on 
their activities. Exchange of information, therefore, enables inspectors to compare facts reported by 
the State Party via Article III information channels with what is observed directly during the 
inspection program. The United States (1989) highlighted the advantages of the wide availability of 
inspection reports in ensuring accurate and complete information about the ATS and practices. 
Further benefits noted by the United States included maintaining the confidence of Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty that the objectives, provisions and recommendations adopted under the Madrid 
Protocol are being fully implemented and enforced. Inspection reports that have been submitted by 




  By the very international nature of Antarctic operations, culture and politics will impact 
upon implementation of the regulatory framework, development of guidelines or checklists and the 
recommendations outlined in inspection reports (Jabour, 2013). However, Walton (2015) 
acknowledges that the success of the Treaty and the use of Antarctica for science and peace, has 
largely been due to the freedom to inspect. This same inspection process can be improved to further 
encourage (or mandate) that signatories to the Madrid Protocol meet their legal obligations to 
protect Antarctica.  
  The practical and political achievements, as discussed, which are associated with conducting 
inspections of Antarctic sites and facilities have provided evidence of an inspection regime that is 
valuable. However, as Antarctic operations continue to grow in both number and complexity it has 
become increasingly clear that the ATS should actively consider implementing a mandatory process 
for managing the scheduling, reporting and timely follow-up of inspection recommendations. 
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Character and Regulatory Weight of Inspection Recommendations  
  Once an inspection has been carried out, the inspecting party submits an inspection report, 
first to the State Party responsible, allowing the right of response. The report is then circulated to all 
ATCPs in addition to the CEP. It is then tabled at the following Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
(ATCM) and made public on the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website (Jabour, 2013). The process is 
transparent with the responsibility to act on any suggestions arising from inspection reports 
remaining solely with the Party in question. 
 In 2014, in an attempt to address and build upon the present inspection regime, nine 
nations led by the United Kingdom, submitted a Working Paper at the ATCM in Brasilia entitled ‘Key 
Thematic Recommendations from ten years of Antarctic Treaty Inspection Reports.’ The paper 
outlines five key themes from the conclusions and recommendations of the inspection reports from 
the ten years prior. In addition, the report highlights recurrent general themes with a view that they 
would be explicitly discussed at the ATCM to improve current best practice and create positive 
environmental outcomes (United Kingdom et al., 2014).  
The key themes identified were: 
- Theme 1: Environmental Management 
- Theme 2: Logistics & Infrastructure 
- Theme 3: Scientific Collaboration 
- Theme 4: Tourism 
- Theme 5: Communications 
  The paper acknowledged that “while the recommendations directly relating to specific 
stations, vessel, installations, etc., have been generally welcomed and considered by the relevant 
Treaty Party, many of the recent Inspection Reports have also contained more general recurrent 
conclusions and recommendations” (United Kingdom et al., 2014, p.3), which ought to be revised 
and addressed at the ATCM. Many of these recurrent recommendations contained within the 
working paper were logical suggestions for setting minimum standards in order to achieve 
continent-wide best environmental practice. However, as Walton (2015) points out the only element 
of the working paper that was agreed upon at this ATCM, was for the Secretariat to “archive 
inspection reports and related papers in such a way that they could be searched for by station” 
(Walton, 2015, p.107). Legalistic views around sovereignty overwhelmed the discussions, making it 
impossible to reach a consensus on any of the issues brought to the table (Walton, 2015). 
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  The lack of standardisation across the regime in the form of mandatory inspection guidelines 
has left the provision to inspect open to interpretation. An inspection checklist was put together in 
1995 and revised in 2010. Nonetheless, the checklist functions as a guideline rather than a minimum 
requirement or standard procedure. This becomes increasingly evident in the wide variation of the 
inspection reports produced during the process, with some inspectors producing 30 pages for one 
inspection and others one page covering three inspections. No mandatory follow up is required by 
inspected State parties, nor a right of response and, whilst there is a provision for response as 
outlined earlier, many do not respond to inspection reports (Walton, 2015; Jabour, 2013; United 
Kingdom et al., 2014). In addition, ownership of this process is not evenly distributed, as noted 
earlier, with an uneven financial burden of inspections as a result. Six of the Consultative Parties 
including Bulgaria, Ecuador, India, Poland, Ukraine and Uruguay, have never taken up the right to 
inspect (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2016). The lack of interest in participating regularly in the 
inspection regime raises questions of levels of commitment to the Treaty and environmental 
conduct in the Antarctic; incidentally, incidents of low compliance coincide with ad-hoc inspection 
participation. 
   
  Presently there are no consequences for breaches to the Madrid Protocol and, therefore, it 
is a conscience incentive that influences best environmental practice, stirring debates about how 
countries value and place value on the Antarctic. Furthermore, no breaches of the Treaty have ever 
been officially reported and yet are clearly contained within many of the inspection reports (Jabour, 
2013; figures 4-6). Therefore, it can be surmised that politics present a major hurdle within the 
inspections process with some commenting that, as a result, inspections are token and superficial 
(Jabour, 2013). The political will appears to be lacking to change current practices or to remediate 
bad practices of the past. This is despite State Parties having signed the Madrid Protocol and agreed 
upon their own set of standards; standards, which in many cases, simply are not being met today. 
Arguably this is a failure of the system in its inability to maintain a minimum set of environmental 
standards outlined in the Madrid Protocol. Slow progress with consensus decision making also plays 
a role with strategic interests distracting from continent-wide best environmental outcomes, as 
noted during the Brasilia ATCM in 2014 (Jabour, 2013). This begs the question; what would it take to 
bring confrontation on such issues and what would it serve?  
    
  The issue of military activity and presence in the Antarctic remains unclear with countries 
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not agreeing on an interpretation of the rules. For example, the 2014/15 joint UK and Czech 
inspection report highlighted this variation: “the Observers were struck by the very wide range of 
approaches taken to staffing and training, ranging from stations which were entirely operated by the 
military, to those which were completely civilian” (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015, p. 10). 
The Argentine base ‘Camara’, for example, had 17 personnel present at the base during the time of 
inspection, all of whom were from the Argentine Navy. The report states “at the time of the visit 
there were no scientists working at Camara. There were no permanent scientific facilities or major 
scientific equipment at the station.” (United Kingdom and Czech Republic, 2015, p. 69) The 
inspection report goes on to provide the following recommendation: “That the [Argentinean 
National Antarctic Program] DNA develop a future science plan for Camara and consider whether 
the facilities available at Camara were able to support such plans.” (United Kingdom and Czech 
Republic, 2015, p. 71). The use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes, as addressed earlier evidently 













Figure 4. Current station buildings buried by snow at Vostok Station (Australia, 2011, p.30). 
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Figure 6. Eco-Nelson base. “The largest room in the main hut had at least 30cm of solid ice on the floor, 
indicating a lengthy period of neglect” (United Kingdom & Czech Republic, 2015, p. 87). 
  Jabour (2013) highlights that no official breaches to the Antarctic Treaty or Protocol have 
ever been reported, and yet as evidenced in figures 4-6, breaches under the provisions of the 
Madrid Protocol are clearly taking place. Significant legacy issues of activities prior to the entry into 
force of the Protocol exist across the Antarctic, especially in terms of waste management practices. 
For example, the current buildings at Vostok station (figs. 4 and 5) are all under snow to some 
degree, with the original station now completely covered (Australia, 2011). Figure 6 shows Eco-
Nelson, a non-governmental Czech station which also faces significant legacy issues. The joint UK 
and Czech inspection team in the 2014/15 summer visited the base with the following comments 
made in the subsequent report: “Whatever the earlier rationale for the facility, the Observers were 
not convinced that such a justification existed for it now. In the view of the Observers it should be 
closed down and the huts cleaned up and removed from Antarctica…the facility should be removed 
as soon as possible and the surrounding area cleaned-up and remediated.” (United Kingdom and 
Czech Republic, 2015, p.89). Both of these examples highlight archaic poor environmental practices 
that are continuing to impact on the Antarctic environment, with issues of liability and responsibility 
becoming increasingly complex. 
 
Future Recommendations   
  The environmental standards set in the late 1980s were left deliberately vague and as a 
result “great disparities exist between States parties regarding interpretation and operationalisation 
of the Madrid Protocol” (Jabour, 2013, p. 101). Nation states are not truly objective in the 
operations in the Antarctic, hence the tendency toward joint and multi-national inspection teams 
which have many benefits. ASOC (1992) have suggested a potential solution to issues of compliance 
could be the adoption of an independent inspectorate. Therefore, in addition to multi-national 
inspection teams, independent inspections or at least the presence of independent inspectors 
should be considered in the future. A major advantage that an inspectorate would have in reviewing 
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compliance would be its status as a non-political body within the Treaty System, which would result 
in presentation of unbiased information; perhaps more so than that of a national inspection team.  
 
  A more stratified approach to inspections with the establishment of a formal schedule of co-
ordination between countries, would ensure bases, vessels and so on were inspected on a regular 
basis within, for example, a five year period and could “avoid the ‘over inspecting’ of areas which are 
visited more frequently” (Giuliani, 1996, p.470). In addition a priority list could be created with more 
frequent follow-up inspections to non-compliant bases and new bases. Inspected parties should also 
be required to provide feedback in the form of a follow up report within six months of the inspection 
acknowledging and responding to all the recommendations made by the inspectors. Furthermore, a 
list of all Antarctic facilities should be compiled by individual State parties to then be collated and 
held on the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat website as no such list currently exists (ASOC & UNEP, 2003). 
Rather than a guideline, the inspection checklist should become a mandatory tool used to create 
consistency and standardisation across the inspections process, making comparisons across years 
and between bases easier. Photographs in all inspection reports would also be a useful addition for 
future inspection parties.  
 
  Jabour’s paper ‘The Utility of Official Antarctic Inspections: Symbolism without sanction?’ 
noted that “preliminary research did not uncover compelling evidence of extensive changes in 
behaviour as a result of inspections” (Jabour, 2013, p.102). It can therefore be proposed that the 
inspections regime in its present format is largely a symbolic exercise. Jabour (2013) goes on to 
suggest that criticism illustrate that “problems stem… as much from systemic negligence and/or 
disinterest, as capacity” (Jabour, 2013, p.102). Where compliance in accordance with the Madrid 
Protocol is simply not being met in all instances across Antarctica, often due to the operational and 
geographical realities (Jabour, 2013). In their current capacity, inspections will fail to elicit 
unanimous positive environment outcomes across the Antarctic without the consequences for non-
compliance with the protocol. However, any changes to the system will be slow and likely met with 
strong opposition with Consultative Parties to the treaty all possessing an effective power of veto 
and with decisions requiring consensus.  
 
Conclusion 
  The 1959 Antarctic Treaty afforded the right to inspect to all member States with a focus on 
the use of Antarctica for peace and science and, although the original military reason for inspections 
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is still valid, the present focus has been on environmental considerations, especially since the 
agreement on the Madrid Protocol in 1991. The aim of these rights to inspect is to encourage 
compliance with the prohibitions contained within the Treaty and the Protocol. The inspections 
regime is a valuable tool with which Parties operating in Antarctica work to ensure positive 
environmental outcomes, boasting numerous practical and political achievements over the past 
decades. However, the effectiveness of the regime within the highly political context of the Antarctic 
Treaty System and the complex jurisdictional issues surrounding activities has been challenged. 
There is considerable variation in the operationalisation and interpretation of the Treaty and the 
Protocol between States, with Jabour arguing that; “it is likely that such disparities will continue to 
exist because capacity, culture and politics are practically and politically outside the control of the 
Committee for Environmental Protection and the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting” (Jabour, 
2013, p.102). In their current capacity, inspections will fail to elicit unanimous positive environment 
outcomes across the Antarctic without consequences for non-compliance with the Treaty or the 
Protocol. A more stratified approach to inspections, with the establishment of a formal schedule, 
mandatory checklists as well as increased ownership of the regime is required in order for the 
inspection regime to live up to its potential. However, any changes to the system will be slow and 
likely met with strong opposition, with Consultative Parties to the Treaty all possessing an effective 
power of veto and with decisions requiring consensus. Increased political will is required to achieve 
compliance with the environmental standards set within the Protocol in 1991, where issues of 
sovereignty need to be put aside in order to move forward and ensure the best outcomes for 
Antarctica.  
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